This research studies the propensity of individuals to violate implications of expected utility maximization in allocating retirement savings within a compulsory de-…ned contribution retirement plan. The paper develops the implications and describes the construction and administration of a discrete choice experiment to almost 1200 members of Australia's mandatory retirement savings scheme. The experiment …nds overall rates of violation of roughly 25%, and substantial variation in rates, depending on the presentation of investment risk and the characteristics of the participants.
Introduction
De…ned contribution schemes are now the dominant model for retirement income provision in many countries. As a result, investment decisions that were once the province of wealthy households and their advisers are now the norm for most adults in these countries. One of the most di¢ cult of these decisions, particularly for unsophisticated investors, is choosing a portfolio for retirement savings, where an appreciation of investment risk is crucial. This brings to the fore interesting positive questions:
for example, how is investment risk assessed by individuals in allocating retirement wealth, and by retirees in consuming out of this wealth? The fact that public policy increasingly compels these private decisions leads to attendant normative questions:
what kinds of information and guidance e¤ectively inform retirement portfolio allocation decisions, and how should options for these allocations be structured?
This study elicits decisions about the allocation of retirement wealth from a panel of 1199 participants in the compulsory retirement savings scheme in Australia (Superannuation Guarantee). We examine these decisions in the context of the core expected utility model of portfolio allocation, and …nd signi…cant violations of this model. The propensity for these violations to occur varies systematically with the way in which risk is presented, as well as with the age and quantitative skills of workers. Our …ndings are relevant for the presentation of risk to participants in de…ned contribution retirement plans, for education in support of more informed decisionmaking by these participants, and for public policy decisions involving compulsory retirement schemes.
Allocation of retirement wealth is the most signi…cant and sophisticated …nancial decision that many individuals ever make. In economics, the core model for this decision begins with a regular (i.e., monotone increasing and concave) utility function for consumption and stipulates that portfolio allocations are made so as to maximize expected utility. Section 2 explains how we used this model in designing the discrete choice experiment that elicited the retirement savings allocation decisions from our panel. It develops two restrictions on the decisions panel respondents made.
The strong restriction (Proposition 1) is solely a consequence of the expected utility model, and implies that certain allocation decisions should never be observed. The weak restriction (Proposition 2) follows under the further condition that from the information about risk presented, respondents infer an ordering with respect to second order stochastic dominance, and implies that certain pairs of allocation decisions should never be observed.
Our approach builds on previous studies that have employed an array of methods to elicit risk preferences. These studies vary widely with respect to the magnitude of risk under consideration and the method of elicitation. Academic experimental studies have asked lottery questions (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002; Kimball et al. 2008 ).
Empirical investigations have inferred risk parameters from observed portfolio allocations or insurance choices (e.g., Friend and Blume 1975, Barseghyan et al. 2009 ).
More recent methods include interactive interfaces such as distribution builders (Goldstein et al. 2008) or experience sampling, which gives feedback about risky choices through web-based platforms (Haisley et al. 2010) .
The discrete choice experiment that is detailed in Section 3 recognizes that retirement portfolio decisions involve a substantial fraction of lifetime wealth, where risk aversion should be signi…cant, as opposed to decisions about lotteries where the proportion of wealth involved is often small, and the impact of risk aversion is therefore negligible. The form of our survey resembles instruments used in the …nancial services sector to obtain relevant information about clients, and is similar to recent academic studies (e.g. Gerardi et al. 2010 ) that have measured quantitative aptitude. The form of the discrete choice experiment contained in our survey instrument is similar to choices that confront workers deciding on retirement savings portfolios.
The experiment varies both the level and presentation of risk. There are four levels of risk, common to all respondents and presentations, driven by an underlying lognormal distribution of risky asset returns. There are nine risk presentations, each respondent being exposed to three. Each respondent makes retirement portfolio allocations in twelve environments, the Cartesian product of the four risk levels and three risk presentations. In each of these allocations the respondent selects the best and the worst from a portfolio consisting entirely of risky growth assets, a portfolio consisting entirely of an in ‡ation-protected guaranteed bank deposit, and a portfolio in which contributions are divided equally between purchases of the growth asset and the bank deposit. Thus each respondent reveals a preference ordering over the three alternatives in a dozen di¤erent settings.
Section 4 studies the rates of violation of the strong and weak restrictions in the context of three statistical models. The rate at which respondents violate the strong restriction at some risk level varies by the presentation of risk, the lowest rate being 14% and the highest rate being 31%. For the weak restriction the rates of violation are between 25% and 37%. Presentations of risk stating the frequency with which returns will exceed or fail a benchmark have higher rates of violation than do presentations stating the probability of returns above or below a specifed level. In all risk presentations the propensity to violate either restriction is substantially lower for respondents with high numeracy scores than it is for those with low numeracy scores, and it is substantially lower for older than for younger respondents. For older respondents with high numeracy scores the probability of violating the restrictions is about 5%; for younger respondents with low numeracy scores it is over 60%.
The …nal section reviews these and other …ndings. It outlines tentative conclusions about the presentation of risk in retirement portfolio decisions, the implications for public policy of requiring these decisions of most adults, and productive directions for future research.
Analytical framework
The discrete choice experiment described in the next section asks respondents to rank three alternative portfolios of retirement wealth. In the …rst portfolio S ("safe") all retirement contributions purchase a guaranteed bank deposit that provides an annual real return of 2%. In the second portfolio R ("risky,"consisting of growth assets like equities and property) these contributions purchase shares in a growth fund that yields an uncertain return. In the third portfolio M ("mixed") half of each period's contributions purchase the bank deposit and half purchase shares in the growth fund.
The outcome of each experiment for each respondent can be written as an ordered triple: for example, M RS indicates an outcome in which M was ranked …rst and S was ranked last.
For each respondent the experiment varies the information provided about the uncertain return of R. The information varies in two dimensions. The …rst dimension is the presentation of risk to the respondent. For example, respondents were presented with the frequency of negative annual returns, the …fth and ninety-…fth percentiles of returns, or one of several alternatives detailed in the next section. In the discrete choice experiment each set of information presented corresponds to one of four di¤erent log-normal distributions of the gross real return y i to R, indexed by i = 1; 2; 3; 4.
At risk level i, log (y i ) iid s N ( i ; 2 i ) and the corresponding net return is y i 1. The gross return on S is x = 1:02 and the gross return on M is z i = (x + y i ) =2. The experiment is designed so that each respondent is exposed to three di¤erent risk pre-sentations, with each presentation repeated four times, calibrated to the four returns indexed by i = 1; 2; 3; 4. Table 1 shows the parameters of each of the four log-normal distributions of gross return and the corresponding mean and standard deviation of the annual rates of net returns of the portfolios R, M , and S. The four levels of risk were chosen so that the rankings of R, M , and S would vary across the risk levels in a simple model of retirement savings portfolio allocation.
In each period before retirement, each worker has an exogenous stream of earnings, (1 ) t 1 = (1 ). The CRRA pa-rameter is worker-speci…c, with 2 [0; 1) and U (c t ) = log (c t ) when = 1. Since returns to the retirement savings portfolio are independent and identically distributed each period, it follows (Ingersoll, 1997 Chapter 11) that workers maintain the same allocation of their portfolio to S, M or R each period, even though they are free to The only function of this simple model was to guide us in selecting numerical values in risk presentations. None of the model's speci…c assumptions are made in any of the following analysis. Likewise, the only role of a log-normal distribution for gross returns to the risky asset R was to calibrate quantities across alternative presentations of risk. There was no attempt to convey to respondents the idea that these returns are log-normally distributed, nor is the assumption of log normality made in any of the analysis that follows.
The analysis in Section 4 tests two potential restrictions on the rankings of R, M and S. Both assume risk aversion and expected utility maximization. The strong restriction assumes nothing further. The weak restriction assumes, in addition, that from the information provided in the experiment respondents infer mean-preserving spread relationships among the gross returns to R at di¤erent risk levels.
Proposition 1 (Strong restriction on retirement portfolio choice) The orderings SRM and RSM are inconsistent with expected utility maximization and risk aversion.
Proof. Recall that the gross returns to R, S and M are y i , x, and z i = (x + y i ) =2
respectively. Risk aversion is equivalent to concavity of utility so that
and so M cannot be the least preferred allocation of retirement wealth.
For the log-normal distributions indicated in the second and third columns of Table 1 , i = i < j = j for all pairs (i; j) with i < j. It follows (Levy 1991 Respondents are always told the means of net returns, and each time they are asked to provide an ordering among R, M and S they are reminded of these means.
As detailed in the next section, each respondent is exposed to three di¤erent presentations of risk associated with R and M , and there is always a natural ordering within each of the presentations: for example, if a respondent is told that negative returns occur on average a years out of every 20, it is natural to associate larger a with greater risk. It is therefore reasonable to entertain the prospect that from the information provided respondents infer changes in spread with a common mean.
Proposition 2 (Weak restriction on retirement portfolio choice) Suppose
(1) Orderings are consistent with expected utility maximization and risk aversion;
(2) The distribution of R at risk level j is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of R at risk level i for all pairs (i; j) with i < j.
Then the pairs of orderings with an entry A, B i or C in Table 3 are all possible, whereas those with entries D or E are all impossible. 
Proof. Pairs of orderings for cells with entry A can all be generated by su¢ ciently small di¤erences in mean-preserving spread between risk levels i and j.
Pairs of orderings for cells marked B i can be found in Table 3 : = 4; i = 1; j = 3 for B 1 , = 3; i = 1; j = 3 for B 2 , = 2; i = 1; j = 4 for B 3 , = 3; i = 1; j = 2 for B 4 , = 2; i = 1; j = 3 for B 5 and = 1; i = 1; j = 3 for B 6 .
Appendix A provides an example that satis…es conditions (1) and (2) and generates the pair of orderings for the cell marked C.
Conditions 1 and 2 imply E [U (y i )] > E [U (y j )] (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) and therefore
. This eliminates pairs of orderings in which S is preferred to R at the lower risk level i but R is preferred to S at the higher risk level j, the cells of Table 3 with an entry D.
Condition 2 is equivalent to the existence of a random variable " with E (" j y i ) = 0 for all y i such that y j = y i + " (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) . Therefore
, which is equivalent to the distribution of M at risk level j being a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of M at risk level i.
thus eliminating pairs of orderings in which S is preferred to M at the lower risk level i but M is preferred to S at the higher risk level j, the cells of Table 3 with entry E.
The discrete choice experiment
The experiment is the third part of an on-line, four-part survey instrument that collects substantial information about the characteristics of each respondent. The instructions for the experiment, reproduced in Appendix B, present a simpli…ed retirement savings (superannuation) program in which the only options for the savings portfolio are S, M and R. The instructions indicate that the respondent will be asked to indicate which option he or she would be most likely to choose, and which option he or she would be least likely to choose, in a series of settings in which average returns remain the same but levels of risk vary. There are 36 settings in total, of which each respondent sees 12. Each setting presents the annual returns net of in ‡ation (2% for S, 3.25% for M , and 4.5% for R) together with a presentation of risk for M and R.
The 12 settings are the Cartesian product of the four risk levels indicated in Table 1 (common to all respondents) and three of the nine risk presentations.
Many presentations of risk to retirement savers are possible. We utilize nine There is a 9 in 10 chance of a return between x% and y%. 2
There is a 1 in 10 chance of a return outside x% and y%. 3
There is a 1 in 20 chance of a return above y%. 4
There is a 1 in 20 chance of a return below x%. 5
On average, positive returns occur 20 x years in every 20. 6
On average, negative returns occur x years in every 20. 7
On average, returns above the bank account occur 20 x years in every 20: 8
On average, returns below the bank account occur x years in every 20. 9
See Figure 1 alternatives, drawn from standard prospectuses of the …nancial services industries in Australia, Europe and the United States, as well as from related studies (Vlaev et al. 2009 ). Table 4 indicates the …rst eight presentations, and Table 5 shows the corresponding numerical values for the portfolios M and R at the four risk levels.
Presentation 9 gives the same information as presentations 1 through 4 in graphical form, together with the sure return on S. Figure 1 illustrates presentation 9 using the highest risk level. Presentations 1 through 4 and presentation 9 convey risk through the cumulative distribution function of returns each year. Presentations 5 through 8 convey risk through the frequency of returns above or below simple reference points. 9 Risk level 2 ( 9; 17:5) ( 19:5; 32:5) 7 8 9:5 9:5 Risk level 3 ( 11:5; 21) ( 25; 40) 8 9 10 10 Risk level 4 ( 16:5; 29) ( 34:5; 55:5) 9 10 11:5 11:5
Each respondent is exposed to three of the risk presentations. For one group of respondents, A, the presentations are 1, 2 and 9; for group B, 3, 4 and 9; C, 5, 6 The other parts of the survey instrument provide respondent characteristics, and our …ndings utilize some of that information. The …rst part consists of questions about subjects' retirement savings, including the aggregate amount in their superannuation accounts. From this amount we constructed a polychotomous covariate, "superannuation,"coded as 1 for accounts of less than $20,000, 2 for accounts in the range $20,000 to $80,000, 3 for accounts in the range $80,000 to $500,000, and 4 for accounts above $500,000. (Individuals'average accumulation in Australia's superannuation program is about $70,000.)
The second part of the survey consists of 21 questions measuring numeracy and …nancial literacy skills, as well as self-assessed knowledge of …nance, access to …nancial education, use of …nancial advice and con…dence in stock market recovery. The …ve numeracy questions are drawn from Gerardi et al. (2010) and are designed to test basic concepts such as fractions, percentages, division, multiplication and simple probability. They are provided here in Appendix C. We …tted a factor model to the responses to these questions, and used the …tted factor loadings to create the covariate "numeracy," a numeracy score for each respondent. This covariate has mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
The third part of the survey instrument is the experiment just described. The 
Findings
We investigate the propensity of respondents to violate Propositions 1 and 2, respectively, as a function of the three covariates just described. Since there were 1199 complete responses, each providing 12 orderings of S, M and R, there are 14; 388 orderings all together. Table 6 indicates the frequency of each ordering in each of the Independence across respondents is a plausible and conventional assumption, and we maintain this assumption throughout our formal interpretation of the outcome of the experiment. For each risk presentation f (f = 1; : : : ; 9) let r index the respondents assigned to that presentation; r ranges from 1 to about 300 for f = 1; : : : ; 8 and r = 1199 for f = 9. Each respondent r assigned to presentation f creates an ordering of S, M and R at each risk level i. Table 6 indicates substantial di¤erences in response across risk presentations, and this is con…rmed by formal tests.
The strong restriction
The 1355 orderings RSM and SRM (about 9% of the total) violate the strong restriction (Proposition 1). Proceeding to a more formal analysis, for each combination of r and i we observe 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 violations of Proposition 1. De…ne the dichoto-
f r , set to 1 if respondent r violates Proposition 1 (i.e., orders M last) j or more times in the four orderings in presentation f . From our assumption of independence across respondents, it follows that for each combination of f and j the variables v (j) f r are also independent across the respondents r assigned to presentationf . Table 7 : Probabilities of at least one violation (j=1) and at least two violations (j=2) in the independent response model for violation of the strong restriction Group:
(1; 2; 9) (3; 4; 9) (5; 6; 9) (7; 8; 9) j violations j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 p f , independent across f as well as r. We refer to this as the independent response (IR) model. Table 7 provides the parameter estimates for these models. For example, the fraction of respondents who violated the strong restriction at least once in presentation 1 is 0.153; at least twice, 0.063. For all of the entries the standard error of estimate is about 0.02, and so di¤erences across presentations are almost all statistically signi…cant. For j = 1, violation probabilities are higher in presentations 5 through 8 than in presentations 1 through 4, and the same is true for j = 2. The distinguishing feature of presentations 5 through 8 is that they all convey risk as the frequency of returns above or below a speci…ed benchmark, whereas presentations 1 through 4 provide probability bounds on annual returns (see Table 4 ). Violation probabilities for presentation 9, which conveys these probability bounds in graphical terms, are more similar to those in presentations 1 through 4 than in presentations 5 through 8.
We also consider the binomial logit model P v
f ; x r , where x r denotes the 3 1 vector of covariates of numeracy, age and superannuation described at the end of the previous section and (j) f is the corresponding 4 1 vector of parameters. In this model responses are independent across presentations f as well as respondents r, conditional on the covariates. The independent response model is a special case, in which the covariate coe¢ cients are all zero. We refer to this binomial logit model as the conditionally independent response (CIR) model. Table 8 provide the estimated odds ratios from this model, that is,
The entries in
(1) of a one-unit increase in the indicated covariate. For example, for risk presentation 4 (group B, presentation f 2 ) the odds ratio for numeracy is 0.535, which is signi…cantly di¤erent from 1.0 at the 5% level. Except for presentation 5 ("On average, positive returns occur 20 x years in every 20") the e¤ect of the numeracy score on the conditional probability of violating the strong restriction is substantively powerful and statistically signi…cant. The strongest e¤ect is in presentation 1 ("There is a 9
in 10 chance of a return between x% and y%") where an increase of two standard deviations in numeracy reduces the odds ratio (1) by a factor of 0:385 2 = 0:148 : if, at a numeracy score of 0, the other covariates indicate the probability of violating the strong restriction is 0.50, then the probability of violating the strong restriction is 0:385=(1 + 0:385) = 0:278 when numeracy is 1 and 0:722 when numeracy is -1.
For an odds ratio of 0:6, the same exercise implies probabilities of 0.375 and 0.625 of violating the strong restriction at numeracy scores of 1 and -1, respectively.
Age is also important in the conditional probability of violating the strong restriction, especially in presentations 5 through 8, which (unlike presentations 1 through 4) refer to time dimensions of risk. Age is then a more important conditioning covariate in presentation 9 (the graphical presentation of risk) for those respondents who were exposed to the presentations referring to time (Groups C and D) than for those respondents who were not. In a situation where the covariates numeracy and superannuation imply the probability of violating the strong restriction is 0.5 for a 
(1; 2; 9) (3; 4; 9) (5; 6; 9) (7; 8; 9) j violations j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 Risk presentation f 1 There is no evidence that the conditional probability of violating the strong restriction systematically increases or decreases with the size of the respondent's superannuation account. Point estimates of odds ratios exceed one for some presentations, are less than one for others, and are statistically signi…cant at level 5% in 2 of the 24 cases.
Comparison of the maximized log likelihood values in the IR and CIR models provides another indication of the importance of the covariates. For each respondent group (A, B, C, D) and for the cases of at least one violation (j = 1) and at least 
(1; 2; 9) (3; 4; 9) (5; 6; 9) (7; 8; 9) j violations j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 Log likelihoods IR two violations (j = 2), Table 9 provides the sums of the log likelihoods over all three presentations in the IR model and in the CIR model. Because the CIR model nests the IR model the maximized likelihood is necessarily greater in the former than in the latter. These increases range from 17.4 (group C, j = 2) to 55.1 (group D, j = 1). The null hypothesis of no e¤ect of covariates in the CIR model implies that the asymptotic distribution of twice the increase is 2 (9). Table 9 reports these test statistics in the next-to-last line, and all imply rejection at the 0.01% level.
Although the CIR model is more general than the IR model, it still imposes the assumption that beyond knowing a respondent's numeracy, age and superannuation, choices of investment option for the retirement portfolio are independent from one presentation to another. If this were true, elicitation of risk preferences, for instance, by …nancial advisors, would be simpli…ed because collection of the information in the covariates (numeracy, age and superannuation) is more straightforward than eliciting individual attitudes toward risk. There is much to argue against this simpli…cation, from the heterogeneity of preferences conventionally presumed in demand models to the resources devoted to individual risk elicitation in the …nancial services industry.
To measure the importance of idiosyncratic risk preferences and to provide a formal test of this apparently strong assumption, we generalize the CIR model. In this generalization, the conditionally dependent response (CDR) model is
where the expression on the right side denotes a multinomial logit model with parameter vector
(j)
f 1 ;f 2 speci…c to the presentations f 1 , f 2 and f 3 = 9 to which respondent r is assigned. There are 2 3 = 8 outcomes (m 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 ), and consequently the multinomial logit model has (8 1) 4 = 28 coe¢ cients. Estimates of these coe¢ cients are unsurprising in the context of Table 8 . Coe¢ cients on numeracy and age are mostly negative and of the same magnitude; though because of the small number of observations for some combinations (m 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 ) fewer are statistically signi…cant than was the case in the binomial logit CIR model. 
Given any set of coe¢ cient vectors
for all possible x. Thus the CDR model nests the CIR model, and consequently the maximum of the log likelihood function in each CDR model exceeds the sum of the maximums of the log likelihood functions in the three corresponding CIR models. This is evident in Table 9 . The last line of this table provides formal tests of the hypotheses that the CDR model in each presentation collapses to the product of the CIR models. The conventional asymptotic distributions of these test statistics are chi-square with 16 degrees of freedom (
f 1 is 4 1) or fewer (because for certain presentations and certain of the eight possible outcomes there are four or fewer observations in the CDR model). While the adequacy of the conventional asymptotic distribution theory is open to question in this setting there can be no real doubt that the CIR hypothesis should be rejected. The results in Table   9 indicate substantial dependence of respondent orderings across presentations. Some of this dependence is explained by the covariates numeracy, age and superannuation, but even more must be ascribed to idiosyncratic variation. The …nancial services industry has long devoted substantial resources to eliciting individual tastes for risk, consistent with these results. (See Yooks and Everett (2003) for discussion.)
The weak restriction
A respondent violates the weak restriction (Proposition 2) in a presentation f if either (1) the respondent violates Proposition 1 at one of the four risk levels or (2) the respondent has at least one pair of orderings among the four risk levels that violates Proposition 2. We study these outcomes by de…ning the random variable v f r = 1 if respondent r violates Proposition 2 in presentation f and v f r = 0 if not. The approach is similar to that taken for Proposition 1: we consider …rst independent response (IR), then conditionally independent response (CIR), and …nally conditionally dependent response (CDR) models. Table 10 provides the parameter estimates in the IR model, each parameter having a standard error of estimate of about 0.025. As was the case for the strong restriction, the probability of violations of the weak restriction is higher in presentations 5 through 8, which couch risk in terms of the frequency of returns above or below benchmark values, than it is in the other presentations, which express risk in terms of points on the cumulative distribution function for annual returns. The conditional probabilities of violation of the weak restriction in the CIR model are similar to those of violation of the strong restriction, as detailed in Table 11 . These probabilities decline rapidly with increasing numeracy and age. The e¤ect of numeracy on the conditional probability is about the same as for the strong restriction.
The e¤ect of age is somewhat reduced, and the greater importance of age in presentations 5 through 8 than in the other presentations is somewhat muted. Combined, the impacts of numeracy and age are substantial: if a respondent aged 35 to 54 with a numeracy score 0 (the average) violates the strong restriction with probability 0.5, then (assuming a numeracy odds ratio of 0.6 and an age odds ratio of 0.7) the prob- ability of violation of the weak restriction is about 0.7 for a younger respondent with a numeracy score of -1 and 0.3 for an older respondent with a numeracy score of 1.
As was the case with the strong restriction, there is no indication of a systematic impact of the size of the respondent's superannuation account on violation of the weak restriction. Table 12 details the increase in maximized log likelihood moving from the IR to the CIR to the CDR model. The comparisons are similar to those for the strong restriction, and indicate formal rejection of smaller models in favor of larger ones.
The three covariates again account for a substantial proportion of the dependence of respondent violations of the restriction, moving across presentations, but there is even more dependence that is not accounted for by the covariates. These results reinforce the conclusion that there is value in assessing individuals'attitudes toward risk in retirement planning.
Conclusion
Our analysis of the results of the discrete choice experiment can be summarized in …ve main points, as follows.
1. In a setting that is experimental but similar to that in which real decisions are made, respondents routinely violate the two implications of the expected utility theory of decision-making under risk, detailed in Section 2. These rates range from 14% to 37%.
2. When risk is presented with respect to frequency, for example "On average, negative returns occur 7 years in every 20," the probability of violating the restrictions is greater: about 25% for the strong restriction and 35% for the weak restriction. When risk is presented with respect to the probability of high or low returns each year, for example "There is a 9 in 10 chance of a return between -6% and 14%," the probability of violation is less: about 15% for the strong restriction and 25% for the weak restriction.
3. A respondent's quantitative aptitude, as measured by a short conventional test of numeracy, substantially a¤ects the probability that either restriction will be violated. For example, in the case of the strong restriction with risk presented as frequency, for an otherwise randomly selected respondent with numeracy in the top decile, the probability of violation is about 5%, whereas for one in the bottom decile, it is about 35%.
A respondent's age substantially a¤ects the probability that either restriction
will be violated when the risk presentation invokes the frequency of events. For example, in the case of the strong restriction, for an otherwise randomly selected respondent, the probability of violation is about 15% for a respondent age 55 or older, and about 38% for a respondent age 18 to 34 .
5. In the discrete choice experiment the alternative presentations of risk were all calibrated to the same log-normal distribution of returns at each level of risk.
From the information provided respondents need not have inferred that the distributions of returns were the same across the alternative presentations. Nevertheless, there is strong dependence in the propensity to violate the strong and weak restriction across risk presentations: if a respondent violates a restriction in one presentation this increases the probability that the respondent will violate that restriction in another presentation. Much of this dependence across risk presentations can be attributed to a respondent's numeracy score and age, but it is also the case that much dependence remains after conditioning on these attributes.
From these results we venture several more tentative conclusions about the direction of future research and lessons for the public policy of compulsory de…ned contribution retirement schemes.
1. The strong association between poor numeracy skills and the propensity to violate the expected utility paradigm is strong and consistent with the few studies that have explored this issue (Peters and Levin, 2008; Gerardi et al., 2010) . This relationship is fundamental to the evaluation of public policy that delegates sophisticated …nancial decisions to individuals who are compelled to contribute to de…ned contribution retirement plans. Further research should be undertaken to understand the relationship between quantitative aptitude and quantitative decision making, eventually addressing the question of whether there are policy interventions that might increase quantitative decision-making skills.
2. In the interim, this work would support serious reservations about public policy linking the future welfare of current workers to quantitative decision-making skills that a signi…cant number of them do not possess. The following example shows that entry C in Table 3 is possible. The example was produced by an algorithm that randomly generates discrete random variables on The sure return to S is x = 0:1653. The distribution of y (the gross return to R) has the same 10 points of support in [0; 1] at both risk levels i and j, with E (y) = 0:4562. Therefore the distribution of z (the gross return to M ) also has common points of support at both risk levels i and j, with E (z) = 0:3107. The probability distributions are indicated in the upper panels of Figure 3 . The lower left panel shows the cumulative distribution functions F (y) for R at both risk levels, and the lower right panel shows the values of G (y) := R y 0 F (x) dx for both risk levels. Note that G (y) for the higher risk level either exceeds or is coincident with G (y) for the lower risk level, and therefore y at the higher risk level is a mean preserving spread of y at the lower risk level.
The presentation
Tables 13 and 14 provide complete details for the example. Comparing the two tables note in particular that at the lower risk level i, E [U (y)] = 0:6926 < 0:7030 = For the safe asset with certain return x = 0:1653, U (x) = 0:5759. Thus the ordering is M RS at the lower risk level i and RM S at the higher risk level j, establishing the possibility of entry C in Table 3 .
What we want you to do is simple. There are two questions to ask about each set of options::
1.
If these superannuation options were available for you to invest your money today, which one of the three would you be most likely to choose?
2. If these superannuation options were available for you to invest your money today, which of the three would you be least likely to choose?
Your choices will inform government and industry about better ways to simplify superannuation arrangements.
